Co-founder Status
Fratelli d'Italia was founded in December 2012 by three politicians who had all served within the Popolo della Libertà but who saw the collapse of Berlusconi's political project as an opportunity to establish a new conservative force with clearer identity: Giorgia Meloni, Ignazio La Russa and Guido Crosetto. All three brought distinct assets to the founding: Meloni was a former minister of youth (2008–2011) who had already shown a capacity for political communication and mass mobilisation; La Russa had served as Minister of Defence (2008–2011) and was a central figure in the post-fascist right; and Crosetto brought parliamentary longevity, defence expertise, and credibility in the business and industrial communities that neither of the others possessed in the same measure.
The founding event took place on 21 December 2012, when the three politicians appeared together to launch the new party under the symbol of the tricolour flame — a symbol with roots in the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), the post-war Italian far-right party from which Alleanza Nazionale had descended. The choice of the name Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy), drawn from the opening words of the national anthem, signalled an aspiration to national rather than ideological identity.
Crosetto's status as co-founder rather than late arrival gave him a particular authority within the party that his formal positions did not always fully reflect. He was, alongside Meloni and La Russa, one of the architects of FdI's founding project — its choice of ideology, its positioning within European conservatism, and its strategic decision to remain in opposition rather than join governmental coalitions before 2022.
Roles within FdI
Within Fratelli d'Italia, Crosetto occupied multiple complementary roles. Formally, he served as a member of the party's national leadership bodies, but his most significant contribution was as a public intellectual and spokesperson on defence, NATO, foreign policy and security. In a party that had to establish its governing credentials from scratch — particularly on the international stage, where concerns about FdI's ideological heritage were voiced both in Italy and abroad — Crosetto's clear pro-NATO, pro-Western, pro-Ukraine positions provided crucial reassurance.
He was also, during the years of FdI's opposition role (2013–2022), one of the party's most visible faces in media and public debate. His forthright manner, his willingness to engage critically with government policies across the political spectrum, and his expertise on technical defence questions gave him a profile that went beyond party circles. He was regularly cited by Italian and international media as a significant voice on defence and security, even during the years when FdI polled in single digits.
In parallel, between 2013 and 2022, he served as president of AIAD (Federazione Aziende Italiane per l'Aerospazio, la Difesa e la Sicurezza), the Italian aerospace, defence and security industry federation. This dual role — party leader and industry federation president — was unusual but not constitutionally problematic, and it reinforced his positioning as the Italian centre-right's most credible voice on the intersection of security policy and industrial strategy.
Relationship with Giorgia Meloni
The relationship between Crosetto and Giorgia Meloni is best characterised as a durable professional alliance built on mutual respect and complementary strengths rather than an ideological convergence. Both came from the Italian right, but their backgrounds were distinct: Meloni had her roots in the MSI youth movement and had built her career through party organisation and communication; Crosetto came from a business and industrial background in Piedmont and built his through parliamentary expertise.
Their collaboration in founding FdI reflected a recognition that the party needed both a mass-movement leader and a credibility anchor. Meloni provided the former — the political energy, the communication skills, and the personal charisma that FdI's growth required. Crosetto provided the latter — the business relationships, the defence expertise, the cross-partisan credibility, and the pragmatic centre-right positioning that reassured voters and potential allies who were uncertain about FdI's direction.
The relationship survived the decade of FdI's growth and the transition to government without visible strain. Crosetto's appointment as Defence Minister in the Meloni government was both a natural outcome of his expertise and a reflection of the personal trust that Meloni placed in him. He became, in effect, the minister whose portfolio she delegated most completely, having confidence that his judgement on defence matters aligned with Italy's national interests as the government understood them.
Strategic Contributions
Crosetto's most important strategic contribution to FdI was his role in positioning the party within the mainstream of European and transatlantic conservatism at a time when its ideological heritage made that positioning genuinely contested. The concerns were not trivial: FdI's origins in the post-fascist tradition, its tricolour flame symbol and some of its founders' political histories raised questions in Brussels, in Washington, and among Italian voters who remembered where that tradition had led.
Crosetto consistently and clearly articulated FdI's commitment to NATO, to the European Union (while insisting on reform of EU governance), to the Atlantic alliance, and — after 2022 — to support for Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression. His credibility on these points was reinforced by his years leading AIAD and his longstanding relationships with NATO allied defence establishments. When Meloni's government took office in October 2022, Crosetto's appointment as Defence Minister sent an immediate signal to allied capitals that Italy's NATO commitments were in safe hands.
A second strategic contribution was his role in establishing FdI's economic credibility. As a former businessman and industry federation president, he helped articulate a programme of supply-side economics, industrial policy and fiscal discipline that distinguished FdI from the more populist economic positions of Lega and M5S. This positioning proved important as FdI sought to attract voters from the Forza Italia and centrist electorates that were uncomfortable with economic populism.
Transition to Government
The September 2022 election, which produced FdI's historic result of approximately 26%, confronted the party's leadership with the challenge of governing a major European country. FdI had been in opposition since its founding; most of its parliamentary cadres had no executive experience at national level; and the international context — the Ukraine war, the energy crisis, the post-pandemic economic pressures — made the transition to government especially demanding.
In this context, Crosetto's combination of attributes was particularly valuable. He brought executive experience from his years as Undersecretary of Defence under Berlusconi; he understood the machinery of the defence ministry from inside; he had relationships with the armed forces leadership, with NATO partners, and with the Italian defence industry; and he had the personal standing within the party to manage the inevitable tensions between ministerial responsibility and political loyalty.
His appointment as Defence Minister on 22 October 2022 was widely described as one of the most predictable choices in the formation of the Meloni government. In a cabinet that contained several first-time ministers, Crosetto was one of the very few appointees with direct prior experience in the ministry he would lead.
FdI Party Structure
Fratelli d'Italia operates as a formal political party with a national congress, a national executive committee (Consiglio Nazionale), and a party leader (presidente). Since its founding, the party leader has been Giorgia Meloni, who also serves as President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) following the 2022 election victory.
Ignazio La Russa, the third co-founder, was elected President of the Senate in October 2022 — the second-highest constitutional position in the Italian state. His election required cross-party support beyond FdI's own numbers, indicating a degree of institutional acceptance that would have been difficult to predict when the party won only 2% in 2013.
In the European Parliament, FdI sits within the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which it helped build into one of the Parliament's significant political families. The ECR's positioning — Eurosceptic on questions of European integration but firmly pro-NATO and pro-Atlantic — reflects FdI's own distinctive combination of national sovereignty emphasis and transatlantic commitment.
The party's structure evolved considerably over its decade of growth, developing regional organisations, a youth movement, and the institutional apparatus of a major governing party. By 2022, FdI had transformed from the three-person founding moment of December 2012 into the dominant force in Italian politics.