Guido Crosetto at the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence), November 2022
Crosetto at the EU Foreign Affairs Council (Defence), November 2022 — his first months in office coincided with the most consequential shift in European security in decades.

Assessment Framework

Evaluating a serving minister's performance is inherently political and contested. Context matters: Crosetto took office on 22 October 2022, eight months after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine had transformed the European security environment. The defence portfolio is among the most demanding in the Italian government, given simultaneous commitments across NATO's eastern flank, Mediterranean operations, UN peacekeeping, and bilateral programmes.

Assessment should distinguish between inputs — decisions made, programmes initiated, spending committed — and outcomes — capability delivered, threats deterred, alliances strengthened — with the caveat that many outcomes in defence policy manifest over years or decades. This assessment covers documented, publicly acknowledged developments rather than classified assessments. Significant programmes, including GCAP, will run to the 2030s. Any assessment of a minister still in office is necessarily provisional.

Achievements (Documented)

1. Increased Defence Budget Trajectory

Under the Meloni government, Italy's defence budget has increased successively each year. Crosetto has managed the political challenge of securing parliamentary approval for increases despite significant opposition from PD, M5S, and AVS. Italy moved from approximately 1.38% of GDP in defence spending to a trajectory that, while not yet at 2%, represents a demonstrable and sustained increase — a political as well as a budgetary achievement. Each annual budget cycle has involved managing coalition partners and parliamentary opponents in a political environment where public support for higher defence spending has been limited.

2. Ukraine Assistance Management

Italy has provided multiple packages of military assistance to Ukraine through successive legislative decrees (Decreti), each requiring parliamentary authorisation and coalition management. Crosetto has managed the domestic political difficulty of maintaining consistent assistance — including against strong opposition from M5S and some Lega elements — while keeping Italy's contribution consistent with the broader allied effort. Italy has been a significant contributor to Ukraine's defensive capability. The policy has been maintained through periods of intense domestic political pressure, including public opinion surveys showing majority opposition to weapons transfers.

3. NATO Commitments Maintained

All of Italy's standing NATO commitments have been continued and in some cases strengthened. These include: KFOR (Kosovo Force) command and troop contribution; Baltic Air Policing participation (Italian Typhoons at Ämari, Estonia and Šiauliai, Lithuania); eFP (enhanced Forward Presence) contribution in Latvia; participation at NATO summits with strong Italian positions; and continued hosting of US forces at Aviano, Sigonella, and Camp Darby. No significant reduction in Italian contributions has occurred, and Italy has maintained its profile as a credible and active Alliance member during a period of maximum pressure on Alliance cohesion.

4. Military Modernisation Progress

The Marina Militare's PPA (Pattugliatore Polivalente d'Altura) programme has advanced, delivering new offshore patrol vessels. Army modernisation including armoured vehicles has progressed. Eurofighter Typhoon upgrades have continued. Cybersecurity investment has increased. Space capabilities have been developed within an expanding national space strategy. These represent concrete programme progress within the constraints of Italy's overall budget envelope. Crosetto has framed modernisation as the primary vehicle for maintaining strategic relevance, not merely meeting numerical spending targets.

5. GCAP Commitment

Italy's signature of the GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) agreement in December 2022 — within weeks of Crosetto taking office — secured Italy's place in the next-generation fighter programme alongside the UK and Japan. The GIGO (GCAP International Government Organisation) was formally established in June 2023 under the GCAP International Agreement. This is an industrial and strategic achievement: Leonardo's role as prime Italian industrial partner on a major sixth-generation fighter programme, and Italy's integration into a trilateral security relationship with the UK and Japan that extends beyond Europe. The programme represents both a long-term capability investment and a signal of Italy's intent to remain in the first tier of military aerospace nations.

6. Mediterranean Security Operations

Italy has continued and in some respects expanded its Mediterranean security engagement. EUNAVFOR MED Irini operations continued under Italian leadership. Bilateral defence partnerships with Mediterranean and North African states have been maintained and developed. Italy has maintained an active engagement on the Libya file. The Mattei Plan's security dimension has been developed as a framework for structured engagement with African partner countries. These represent continuity and development of Italy's core strategic neighbourhood engagement at a time when competing demands on the defence portfolio were at their highest.

Ongoing Programmes

The following are in train but not completed — they cannot yet be counted as achievements without further progress:

  • Path to 2% GDP: the trajectory is established but the target has not yet been reached; completion depends on future budget decisions
  • Full GCAP development cycle: first flight target is mid-2020s, entry into service mid-2030s — this is a decades-long programme in its early stages
  • Military recruitment reform: addressing shortfalls in recruitment to full establishment strength is a multi-year process with no near-term resolution
  • Personnel welfare improvements: pay and conditions improvements require sustained budget commitment beyond any single year
  • Bilateral cooperation frameworks: several agreements are in the implementation rather than signature phase, with outcomes to be assessed over time

Challenges

1. Political Opposition to Defence Spending

The consistent opposition of PD, M5S, and AVS to defence budget increases means that every budget cycle involves significant political attrition. Italian public opinion, shaped by a strong pacifist tradition and long-standing scepticism about military investment, provides a durable political resource for opposition parties. The 2% target remains politically contested. Crosetto has faced the structural challenge of advocating a position that, while clearly required by Italy's international commitments, lacks majority domestic political support across much of the left and significant sections of centre and centrist opinion.

2. Public Opinion Scepticism

Surveys have consistently shown Italian public ambivalence or opposition to increased weapons transfers to Ukraine and to military spending increases. A defence minister advocating both faces the challenge of persuading rather than commanding public support — in a democracy, this is a genuine operational constraint. Crosetto has engaged extensively with media and public arguments, but sustained public scepticism represents a structural limitation on the ambition of his programme, particularly in relation to Ukraine support and spending increases.

3. Budget Constraints

Even with successive increases, Italy's defence budget remains insufficient to simultaneously modernise all capability areas, meet personnel welfare commitments, and fund major new programmes like GCAP. Prioritisation means some areas advance more slowly than the security environment demands. Italy's public finances — with debt-to-GDP among the highest in the eurozone — impose structural constraints on the pace of any spending increase, regardless of political will. The tension between defence investment and other spending priorities has been a persistent feature of every budget negotiation during Crosetto's tenure.

4. Personnel Recruitment Shortfall

Italy's armed forces face documented difficulty recruiting to full establishment strength. Private sector competition for technically qualified personnel — particularly in cyber, engineering, and maintenance roles — is significant. Demographic challenges, including a declining working-age population, compound recruitment difficulties. The gap between establishment and actual strength is a documented readiness concern. The most acute shortfall is in precisely the specialised roles — cyber, signals, advanced maintenance — where modern force effectiveness most depends on individual technical skill rather than mass numbers.

5. Coalition Management

Managing coalition partners with different views on Russia, Ukraine, and defence spending has been a persistent operational challenge. Lega's historical relationship with Russia has created documented friction around Ukraine policy. Different coalition perspectives on defence versus social spending create internal tensions in budget negotiations. Coalition government in Italy requires constant management, and the Meloni coalition has been notably heterogeneous on defence-related questions despite governing together on most other issues.

6. Multiple Simultaneous Theatre Commitments

Italy maintains commitments in KFOR (Kosovo), UNIFIL (Lebanon), Mediterranean operations (Irini), Iraq (Inherent Resolve framework), Somalia and East Africa (ATALANTA), and others simultaneously. The combination of personnel, equipment, and logistics requirements across multiple theatres creates strain on armed forces of Italy's size and budget. Managing this commitment portfolio at a time of increased demand on NATO's eastern flank — where Italy also has obligations — requires constant prioritisation of limited resources.

Opposition Perspective

What opposition parties — primarily PD, M5S, and AVS — argue has not been achieved or adequately addressed:

  • Insufficient pace of defence spending increases relative to the urgency of the security environment
  • Inadequate transparency about the content and scale of Ukraine military assistance packages — opposition parties have pressed for greater parliamentary disclosure
  • Conflict of interest concerns about procurement decisions not adequately managed, given Crosetto's prior role as AIAD President
  • Mediterranean irregular migration not adequately addressed as a security and humanitarian matter within the MOD's remit
  • Defence industry SMEs not sufficiently supported relative to large prime contractors such as Leonardo and Fincantieri
  • Parliamentary oversight insufficiently engaged — defence committees not receiving adequate information on operations and procurement

These are opposition arguments, included here for completeness. Their accuracy and weight are politically contested.

Context and Caveat

Crosetto is a still-serving minister; comprehensive assessment must await completion of his term and the declassification of programme details. The security environment since February 2022 makes his portfolio among the most demanding in Europe — comparisons with predecessors must note the dramatic difference in context. Major programmes — GCAP, force modernisation, personnel reform — will unfold over decades. The full measure of decisions made during this tenure will not be visible for years.

This page reflects the publicly available record and will be updated as the public record develops. It is not an endorsement or a critique: it is a structured summary of what has been documented, acknowledged, and argued in public Italian political life since October 2022.