Italy's Minister of Defence

Appointment and Context

Guido Crosetto was sworn in as Minister of Defence on 22 October 2022 as part of the first government led by Giorgia Meloni, following the centre-right coalition's victory in the general election of 25 September 2022. The appointment was notable on several grounds. Crosetto had been one of the three founding members of Fratelli d'Italia in 2012, alongside Meloni and Ignazio La Russa, making him a central figure in the party's origins rather than a political outsider brought in for technocratic expertise.

At the time of his appointment, Crosetto was not serving as a Member of Parliament — he had stood unsuccessfully in the 2022 election. His appointment as a minister without a parliamentary seat is legally permissible under the Italian constitutional system, where ministers may be drawn from outside parliament, serving at the President of the Council's nomination and remaining accountable to parliament through interpellations and hearings. Crosetto had previously served as a Member of Parliament across multiple legislatures — first as a member of Forza Italia, then as part of the formation of Fratelli d'Italia — and had spent several years in the defence industry, most notably as President of Aiad (Federazione Aziende Italiane per l'Aerospazio, la Difesa e la Sicurezza), representing Italy's aerospace and defence industry federation. This industrial background gave him familiarity with procurement, capability planning and the commercial dimensions of Italian defence that few political appointees bring to the portfolio.

The strategic context at appointment was defined primarily by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had begun in February 2022. That invasion had transformed European security calculations, prompted emergency increases in defence budgets across the alliance and raised fundamental questions about NATO readiness and collective deterrence. Crosetto took office at a moment of acute pressure, with Italy expected to demonstrate credible commitment both to increased spending and to active engagement in collective defence frameworks.

Legal and Constitutional Framework

The role of Minister of Defence in the Italian Republic is defined by a combination of constitutional provisions, legislative frameworks and longstanding administrative practice. The Italian Constitution of 1948 vests command of the armed forces formally in the President of the Republic, who acts on the advice of the government. Article 78 grants Parliament the power to declare a state of war and confer necessary powers on the government. Article 87 designates the President as supreme commander of the armed forces. Article 11 contains Italy's famous renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes — a provision whose broad interpretation has historically shaped the political space within which defence ministers operate.

Within this constitutional framework, the Minister of Defence is the political head of the Ministry and the principal civilian authority over the armed forces. The minister is responsible to Parliament for the exercise of these functions, appears before parliamentary committees on defence-related matters, and presents the defence budget for parliamentary approval. The minister is also a member of the Supreme Defence Council (Consiglio Supremo di Difesa), which is chaired by the President of the Republic and includes the President of the Council of Ministers and other senior cabinet members. This body is the principal forum for coordinating national security and defence strategy at the highest level.

The operational chain of command flows through the Chief of Defence Staff (Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa), who is the highest-ranking military officer and the principal military adviser to the minister. The individual service chiefs — Army, Navy, Air Force and Carabinieri — report within this structure. The Carabinieri, uniquely among Italy's military services, functions as both a military force and a national police force with public security responsibilities, creating a particular coordination dimension in its administration.

Institutional Responsibilities

As Minister of Defence, Crosetto carries a broad portfolio of institutional responsibilities that span military, industrial, budgetary and diplomatic dimensions. These responsibilities include oversight of Italy's four armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Carabinieri); management of the defence budget, which is approved annually by Parliament; direction of the Ministry of Defence's civilian administration and the Segretariato Generale della Difesa; oversight of defence procurement and armament programmes; and representation of Italy in the NATO Defence Ministers' format and in the EU Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) format, among other multilateral forums.

The minister also oversees Italy's engagement in multinational military operations — a significant responsibility given Italy's extensive commitments. Italy contributes forces to NATO missions including Enhanced Forward Presence deployments, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and NATO's Mission in Iraq (NMI). Italy also contributes to EU operations including EUNAVFOR MED IRINI. Additionally, Italy participates in United Nations missions, most notably UNIFIL in Lebanon, where Italy has historically been one of the largest contributors and where Italian officers have commanded the force at various points.

Defence industrial policy represents a further dimension of the portfolio. Italy's defence industry, centred on Leonardo and Fincantieri — both companies in which the Italian government retains significant stakes through CDP and MEF — is of strategic and economic importance. The Minister of Defence has a role in shaping procurement decisions that in turn affect these companies, and in representing Italian industrial interests in multinational cooperation programmes such as GCAP, the Eurofighter consortium and FREMM.

Strategic Context at Appointment

The European security environment had undergone its most significant transformation since the end of the Cold War by the time Crosetto took office. Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 destroyed the assumptions of post-Cold War security arrangements that had underpinned defence planning across Europe for three decades. The invasion demonstrated that major conventional conflict was possible on European soil, that the threat from Russia was not merely hypothetical but active and lethal, and that the adequacy of European military stockpiles, readiness levels and industrial production capacity would need to be fundamentally reassessed.

For Italy specifically, the invasion created both immediate pressures and longer-term strategic recalibrations. The immediate pressures included decisions about military assistance to Ukraine, energy supply alternatives (since Italy was significantly dependent on Russian natural gas), and alignment with EU and NATO collective responses. The longer-term recalibrations included a fundamental rethinking of defence investment trajectories, capability priorities and industrial preparedness.

Italy's defence budget at the time of Crosetto's appointment was estimated at approximately 1.5% of GDP — below NATO's 2% benchmark but above the lows seen in earlier years of austerity. Defence spending had been on a gradual upward trajectory since the 2014 Wales Summit, but the rate of increase had not been sufficient to reach the benchmark within the timeframes allies and NATO's military authorities considered adequate. Crosetto inherited both a mandate and a necessity to accelerate this trajectory, doing so within the political constraints of a coalition government and a country where defence spending has historically been contested.

Key Policy Priorities

In his public statements and parliamentary appearances since taking office, Crosetto has consistently articulated several interconnected policy priorities that define his ministerial agenda. The first and most consistent has been a commitment to progressively increasing Italy's defence budget toward the NATO 2% of GDP benchmark. Crosetto has framed this not as a symbolic gesture toward an arbitrary target but as a concrete requirement for maintaining credible armed forces capable of fulfilling Italy's alliance obligations and capable of exercising genuine influence in collective alliance decisions.

Military modernisation has been a closely related priority. Italy's armed forces operate a range of platforms and systems of varying vintages, and the pace of replacement has been constrained by budget availability and procurement timelines. Crosetto has emphasised the importance of accelerating the delivery of major capability programmes, particularly in the air domain (F-35 deliveries, GCAP development), the naval domain (ongoing Fincantieri programmes), and land forces (armoured vehicle replacement and C4I modernisation).

A third priority has been Italy's engagement with the evolving European defence architecture. Crosetto has supported Italian participation in PESCO frameworks, the European Defence Fund and EDIP, recognising that European defence cooperation offers both capability and industrial benefits for Italy. At the same time, he has been consistent in insisting that EU defence initiatives must be structured to complement rather than compete with NATO — a position that reflects Italy's deep institutional investment in the Alliance and its hosting of major NATO commands and installations.

Mediterranean security represents a fourth distinct priority area in Crosetto's ministerial agenda. Italy's geographical position at the centre of the Mediterranean means that instability in North Africa — in Libya, in the Sahel region, and more broadly — affects Italian national security directly through migration flows, energy supply disruption and the risk of armed groups establishing ungoverned spaces in Italy's immediate strategic neighbourhood. Crosetto has been active in developing bilateral defence relationships in the region and in sustaining Italy's contributions to maritime security missions in the Mediterranean basin.

Parliamentary Relationships

As a minister without a parliamentary seat, Crosetto's relationship with Parliament is conducted primarily through formal parliamentary channels rather than through the day-to-day rhythms of parliamentary life to which elected members are accustomed. He appears regularly before the defence committees of both the Chamber of Deputies (Commissione Difesa della Camera) and the Senate (Commissione Difesa del Senato) to present policy developments, respond to parliamentary questions and, when required, seek parliamentary approval for specific decisions such as the sending of military assistance to Ukraine.

The parliamentary dimension of the Ukraine assistance issue has been particularly significant. Italian law requires that any sending of military equipment to a foreign state in conflict receive parliamentary authorisation. This has required the government — and specifically the Defence Ministry — to present and secure parliamentary approval for successive tranches of military aid. The management of these parliamentary authorisations has involved coalition management within the majority parties (where some variance in enthusiasm for military assistance to Ukraine exists) and engagement with the opposition (where positions have ranged from support from the Partito Democratico to scepticism from Movimento 5 Stelle and parts of Lega).

More broadly, the defence budget is subject to the full parliamentary budget cycle, requiring the minister and his officials to appear before committees, respond to amendments and negotiate the final figures within the constraints of the overall state budget framework. This annual process has been central to Crosetto's pursuit of higher defence allocations, and he has been a consistent and at times combative advocate for maintaining and increasing the defence envelope in successive budget laws.

Developments 2022–2024

Since taking office, Crosetto has navigated a period of extraordinary volatility in European security. The ongoing war in Ukraine, the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 and the subsequent conflict in Gaza, instability in the Red Sea affecting maritime trade, and evolving tensions in the western Balkans have all required active Italian engagement and ministerial attention during his tenure.

On Ukraine, Italy has provided multiple tranches of military assistance, including air defence systems that have been particularly valued by the Ukrainian government. Crosetto has been an advocate for maintaining and in some cases increasing this assistance, positioning himself as one of the more active European voices on Ukraine within the Italian government. Managing the political tensions within the coalition on this issue — particularly between the generally pro-assistance positions of Fratelli d'Italia and Forza Italia and the more ambivalent positions of Lega — has required diplomatic management alongside the substantive policy work.

Italy's defence budget has been increased in successive annual budget laws during Crosetto's tenure, with the government committing to a trajectory toward the 2% NATO benchmark over the medium term. Specific major capability programmes have continued — including ongoing F-35 deliveries, significant investment in the GCAP programme, and continued naval shipbuilding for both the Italian Navy and export customers.

Crosetto has also been active in developing Italy's defence relationships with partners in the Indo-Pacific, reflecting a broader Italian acknowledgment that European security and Indo-Pacific stability are increasingly interconnected. Italy's participation in GCAP alongside Japan — a non-European partner — has been an important symbol of this broadened engagement. In the Mediterranean, Crosetto has maintained Italy's active posture, including continued contribution to UNIFIL in Lebanon, engagement with North African governments on security cooperation and advocacy for European and NATO attention to the southern neighbourhood as a security priority comparable to the eastern flank.

Public Communication Style

Crosetto has established a distinctive public communication profile as minister. He is notably direct and sometimes combative in his public statements — willing to engage critics head-on, to acknowledge complexities rather than retreat to formulaic responses, and to address sensitive subjects with a frankness that is not always characteristic of ministerial communication in Italy. His use of social media, particularly X (formerly Twitter), has been extensive, and he has used this channel to respond to critics, correct what he regards as misinformation and engage in substantive public debate about defence policy.

This communication approach has generated both supporters and critics. Supporters regard it as a refreshing departure from the opacity that has sometimes characterised Italian defence policy discourse. Critics have occasionally argued that the minister's directness on sensitive operational and diplomatic matters requires careful management to avoid inadvertently complicating ongoing policy processes. Crosetto himself has navigated health challenges during his tenure — a period of hospitalisation in December 2023 attracted significant public attention — and has been notably open about his personal circumstances in ways that have humanised his public profile.

Challenges

The principal challenges facing Crosetto as minister are structural as well as contingent. The structural challenges include Italy's fiscal constraints, which limit the pace of defence spending increase despite political commitment; the long lead times of major procurement programmes, which mean that investment decisions taken today will not translate into capability for years or decades; and the need to maintain public political support for defence investment in a country where a significant portion of opinion is sceptical of military expenditure on principled grounds.

The contingent challenges are defined by the security environment: the ongoing war in Ukraine and its uncertain trajectory; the potential for escalation or expansion in other theatres; the instability of Italy's southern neighbourhood; and the strains on NATO cohesion that have become apparent in various alliance debates. Managing Italy's contribution to collective security while maintaining domestic political support for that contribution — and doing so in a constrained fiscal environment — is the central challenge of the role.

Crosetto's tenure will ultimately be assessed on whether Italy emerges from this period with more capable, better-equipped armed forces; with a credible trajectory toward the alliance's financial commitments; and with the bilateral and multilateral relationships necessary to exercise the influence that Italy's strategic importance and historical weight warrant. The foundations of that assessment are still being laid, and the durability of the policy trajectory he has set will depend on both his continued tenure and the sustainability of the political and fiscal conditions that have made it possible.