Initiatives and Policy Decisions – Guido Crosetto

7

Major Ukraine assistance decrees (2022–2024)

GCAP

Trilateral fighter programme (Italy, UK, Japan)

+€4bn

Additional defence investment committed over 5 years

3

NATO Summits attended (Vilnius 2023, Washington 2024…)

Policy Decision 1

Military Assistance to Ukraine

Background

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 occurred just weeks before the October 2022 Italian general election that would bring the Meloni government — and Crosetto — to power. Italy's initial military assistance packages were authorised by the outgoing Draghi government under legislative decree, establishing a parliamentary framework that the incoming government inherited and continued.

Decision Taken

Crosetto, as incoming Defence Minister, affirmed continuity with the existing assistance framework and worked with Parliament to renew the authorisation for military assistance. The Italian Parliament has authorised successive tranches of military aid to Ukraine through government decrees (decreti-legge) and parliamentary resolutions. Italy's assistance has included air defence systems, artillery ammunition (155mm), armoured vehicles, and other equipment drawn from Italian armed forces stocks and procured specifically for transfer.

Italy participates in the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (the "Ramstein format"), the US-led coordination mechanism that brings together some 50 allied and partner nations to coordinate defence assistance. Crosetto has been Italy's representative at UDCG ministerial meetings held at Ramstein Air Base and in other locations.

Rationale

Crosetto has consistently framed Italy's Ukraine assistance in terms of international law (Ukraine's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter), alliance solidarity (the commitment to resist aggression against a European neighbour), and Italian national interest (the precedent that would be set by a successful military annexation of Ukrainian territory). He has explicitly rejected the argument that providing weapons prolongs the war, arguing that it enables Ukraine to resist an illegal invasion.

Political Context and Status

The Ukraine assistance policy has not been without political controversy in Italy. Within the governing coalition, elements of the Lega and some voices in FdI have expressed reservations about the scale and duration of assistance. Crosetto has managed these tensions while sustaining Italy's commitments. The parliamentary authorisation framework — requiring periodic renewal — has been a mechanism for maintaining transparency while ensuring democratic oversight. As of 2024, assistance was ongoing through successive authorisation renewals.

Ukraine Assistance Framework

Legal basis Legislative decree + parliamentary resolution (renewed periodically)

Coordination Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format)

Types of support Air defence, artillery ammunition, armoured vehicles, other materiel

Classification Detailed inventories remain classified; general categories are public

Oversight Parliamentary committee hearings; periodic public reporting

Status Ongoing (as of 2024)

Policy Decision 2

Defence Budget Increases

Budget Context

Italy's 2023 spend ~1.5% of GDP (approx. €28–29 billion)

NATO target 2% of GDP

Gap to target ~€10 billion per annum at current GDP

Italy's fiscal constraint High debt/GDP ratio (~140%); EU fiscal rules

Crosetto's approach Multi-year incremental plan with credible trajectory

Additional commitment +€4 billion over 5 years (investment portion)

Background

Italy's defence spending has been a source of allied concern for many years. The country consistently spends below the NATO 2% guideline — a structural feature of Italian fiscal politics, where defence competes with health, education and social security in an environment of high public debt. The Ukraine war and the resulting NATO pressure on European allies to increase spending created a context in which Crosetto had to find a credible response.

Decision Taken

Crosetto secured cabinet agreement for a multi-year investment plan that commits additional resources to defence over five years, with a particular focus on investment in new capabilities (rather than simply operating costs). The plan is structured to show a credible trajectory towards higher spending while accommodating Italy's fiscal realities under the revised EU Stability and Growth Pact. The additional investment covers platform modernisation, ammunition stockpiles, infrastructure and the transition to new capabilities including the F-35 and, in the longer term, GCAP.

Rationale

Crosetto has argued consistently that Italy's defence investment must be understood as a long-term security investment, not a discretionary budget line. He has made the case — in Parliament, in media interviews and in NATO councils — that Italy's geographic exposure to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern instability gives it disproportionate security responsibilities that justify the investment. He has also argued that a stronger Italian defence industrial base returns economic value: the defence sector employs around 60,000 people directly and has significant export earnings.

Status

The multi-year plan is embedded in successive defence budget allocations. Progress towards the 2% target has been incremental; Italy has moved from approximately 1.38% in 2021 towards 1.5% and beyond, but remains short of the 2% target. Crosetto has been transparent about this gap while arguing that the trajectory is positive and the commitment genuine.

Policy Decision 3

GCAP Commitment — Italy's Sixth-Generation Fighter

Background

The decision to pursue GCAP (the Global Combat Air Programme) with the United Kingdom and Japan was taken by the Draghi government and confirmed immediately by the Meloni government, with Crosetto as the principal advocate within the new cabinet. The programme brings together Italy, the UK and Japan to develop a sixth-generation combat aircraft — the Tempest (UK name), F-X (Japan name) — to enter service around 2035.

Decision Taken

Italy committed to the GCAP programme at the highest political level. Crosetto participated in the trilateral declaration of December 2022, and subsequent meetings with UK and Japanese defence ministers sustained the programme's governance and funding commitments. Italy's contribution is managed through Leonardo as national prime contractor, working alongside BAE Systems (UK) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan). The creation of GIGO (GCAP International Government Organisation) in December 2023, headquartered in London, provided the intergovernmental framework for managing the programme.

Rationale

For Italy, GCAP serves multiple objectives: it sustains advanced aerospace and electronics manufacturing capability domestically; it deepens bilateral relationships with the UK (important post-Brexit) and Japan (important in the Indo-Pacific context); it provides Italy with a long-term air superiority capability without dependence on American fifth-generation platforms for its most demanding missions; and it positions Leonardo as a prime contractor in one of the world's most technically demanding aerospace programmes, with implications for decades of industrial capability.

Status

As of 2024, the GCAP programme is in its concept and design phase. The three nations have confirmed funding for the next development phase. Italy has protected GCAP in its defence investment plan. Political continuity across all three governments — including Japan's, which faces its own fiscal pressures — is essential for the programme's success. Crosetto has been a consistent advocate for GCAP within the Italian system and has raised the programme in bilateral meetings with UK and Japanese counterparts.

GCAP: Key Facts

Programme Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)

Partners Italy, UK, Japan

Announced December 2022

Governance body GIGO (est. December 2023, London)

Italian prime Leonardo S.p.A.

Aircraft to replace Eurofighter Typhoon (Italy, UK)

Target IOC c. 2035

Generation Sixth-generation (stealth, AI integration, loyal wingman)

Policy Decision 4

NATO Burden Sharing — Italy's Summit Commitments

Background

NATO summits have become the principal venues for public commitment to alliance obligations. The Madrid Summit (June 2022), held just before Crosetto took office, adopted the new Strategic Concept — the first since 2010 — and reaffirmed the 2% spending target. Crosetto inherited the challenge of implementing these commitments in the Italian system.

June 2022

Madrid Summit

Italy was represented by outgoing PM Draghi and Foreign Minister Di Maio. The Madrid Summit adopted a new Strategic Concept that named Russia as the "most significant and direct threat" and elevated China as a "systemic challenge." Allies reaffirmed the 2% target and agreed to significant increases to NATO Response Force capabilities. These commitments shaped the framework Crosetto inherited on taking office in October 2022.

July 2023

Vilnius Summit

Crosetto attended the Vilnius Summit as Defence Minister alongside PM Meloni. NATO leaders agreed to treat the 2% target as a floor rather than a ceiling, with specific national plans. Crosetto confirmed Italy's multi-year investment trajectory. The Summit also approved Sweden's accession (Finland having joined in April 2023). Italy confirmed continued support for Ukraine, including in the context of discussions about a potential security guarantee framework.

July 2024

Washington Summit

The 75th anniversary Washington Summit was a major political event. Crosetto attended and Italy reaffirmed its commitments. The Summit agreed the Ukraine Compact — a framework for long-term security support — which Italy endorsed. NATO leaders agreed further increases in allied capability targets. The Washington Summit also addressed the 2% spending target with greater specificity, with individual national plans scrutinised in the Defence Planning Process.

Policy Decision 5

Mediterranean Operations

Operation Irini

Operation Irini (the EU NAVAL Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI) was launched in March 2020 to implement the arms embargo on Libya established by UN Security Council Resolution 1970. Italy has been a consistent contributor to Operation Irini, with naval vessels and maritime patrol aircraft participating in the mission. Crosetto has sustained Italy's commitment to Irini as part of Italy's broader engagement with the Libya file — a country with which Italy has deep historical, economic and migration-related connections.

Operation Irini reflects Italy's approach to Mediterranean security: multilateral framework, rules-based mandate, European leadership. Italy hosted the operation's headquarters in Rome (at the Centre for Naval Logistics and Support in Rome) and has been among the most active contributors.

EUNAVFOR MED Aspides

Launched in February 2024 in response to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Operation Aspides is an EU naval mission conducting defensive escort and protection operations for commercial vessels. Italy has contributed to this mission. The operation is distinct from the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian in that it is purely defensive and does not conduct strikes against Houthi targets ashore.

Bilateral Mediterranean Cooperation

Beyond multilateral missions, Italy maintains bilateral naval cooperation agreements with Mediterranean partner states: Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Israel within the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue; and Libya through a complex set of bilateral instruments relating to the 2008 Treaty of Friendship and subsequent security cooperation arrangements. These bilateral relationships cover coast guard cooperation, naval training, port access and intelligence sharing.

Active Missions

Italy's Mediterranean Deployments

Operation Irini (EU) — arms embargo Libya
Operation Aspides (EU) — Red Sea maritime security
Operation Mare Sicuro — national naval presence Mediterranean
UNIFIL (UN, Lebanon) — land and maritime
NATO Sea Guardian (standing maritime force)

Geographic Focus

Mediterranean Strategic Context

Italy's 7,600 km of coastline and island positions — including Lampedusa, 130 km from Tunisia — make the Mediterranean simultaneously Italy's most immediate strategic environment and its most complex policy challenge. Defence, migration, energy security and economic interests all converge in this space.

Policy Decision 6

Military Personnel Policy

Personnel Challenges

Strength ~165,000 active duty (Army, Navy, Air Force, Carabinieri/military)

Recruitment Competitive with private sector in technical roles

Pay Below comparable police/civilian roles in many grades

Housing Shortage of accommodation in high-cost garrison towns

Deployment tempo High: ~9,000 personnel deployed internationally at any given time

Crosetto's priority "The armed forces are their people"

Background

Italy's armed forces face structural personnel challenges that predate Crosetto's tenure but have worsened: declining recruitment applications in technical specialties, pay scales that have fallen behind comparable civilian and police roles, housing shortages in garrison towns, and the psychological burden of a high operational tempo. These issues affect retention and morale.

Decisions Taken

Crosetto has prioritised personnel welfare as a stated policy objective. Measures include: increases to mission allowances for international deployments; progress on pay reclassification for specialist roles; investments in residential accommodation on military bases; and reforms to career progression rules to provide greater predictability. He has also addressed the specific situation of veterans and service members wounded in action, supporting improvements to support services.

On recruitment, Crosetto has pushed for modernised recruitment campaigns targeting younger generations, including digital outreach and clearer communication about military career opportunities beyond combat roles. The technical branches — signals, cyber, logistics — face particularly acute recruitment challenges given competition from the technology sector.

Rationale

Crosetto has been unusually direct about the moral dimension of this agenda: Italy asks service members to put their lives at risk on behalf of the state and is obligated to treat them accordingly. This framing has been broadly welcomed within the armed forces, even where the practical measures have fallen short of what personnel associations have requested.

Policy Decision 7

Defence Industry Support Measures

Background

Italy's defence industry is a significant economic asset: the sector employs approximately 60,000 people directly, with a further 150,000 in the supply chain. Major companies include Leonardo (aerospace, electronics, helicopters), Fincantieri (naval), MBDA Italia (missiles, as part of the European MBDA consortium), Rheinmetall Italia, Oto Melara (now part of Leonardo), Beretta (small arms) and a network of specialist SMEs. Italy is consistently among the top 10 global arms exporters.

Industrial Policy Measures

Crosetto has been an outspoken advocate for Italian defence industry throughout his career — most visibly as AIAD president — and has continued this advocacy as minister. Key industrial policy measures include: the establishment of mechanisms to accelerate domestic procurement cycles (reducing time from contract award to delivery); support for Italian participation in European Defence Fund (EDF) projects; advocacy for Italian companies in the EU defence industrial strategy discussions; and the development of a national defence industrial strategy document that situates Italian industry within the European and Atlantic cooperative frameworks.

On export promotion, Crosetto has been actively involved in defence sales diplomacy, accompanying Italian industry representatives to partner nation markets and making the ministerial case for Italian platforms. Major recent export successes include the Leonardo AW family of helicopters sold globally, Fincantieri vessels exported to Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian navies, and the Beretta PMX and APX pistols adopted by various foreign militaries.

European Defence Industrial Strategy

The European Commission's European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), published in 2024, creates new frameworks for defence industrial investment and cooperation within the EU. Italy has engaged actively with EDIS, seeing it as complementary to NATO procurement alignment. Crosetto has positioned Italy as a proponent of European defence industrial cooperation while defending Italian industrial interests against consolidation pressures that might favour larger French or German primes.

Status

Italy's defence industrial position is strong but faces challenges: the urgency of ammunition replenishment following Ukraine transfers, the need to ramp up production capacity, and the risk of being squeezed between US platforms and larger EU competitors in the medium term. Crosetto's industrial advocacy has been generally well received by Italian industry; the test will be whether funding commitments are sustained through successive budget cycles.

Italian Defence Industry

Direct employment ~60,000

Supply chain ~150,000

Annual exports €4–5 billion (varies by year)

Key companies Leonardo, Fincantieri, MBDA Italia, Rheinmetall Italia, Beretta

EU frameworks EDF, EDIS, PESCO, OCCAR

GCAP role Leonardo — Italian prime contractor

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