Italian Defence Policy

The Strategic Context

Italy's defence policy is shaped by a unique combination of factors: its geography at the centre of the Mediterranean, its founding membership of both NATO and the European Community, a constitutional tradition that has historically restrained military spending, and a defence-industrial base of genuine strategic importance to European allies.

When Guido Crosetto became Minister of Defence on 22 October 2022, the strategic environment had already been transformed by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of that year. European allies were confronting a fundamental reassessment of their security assumptions, and Italy was no exception. The war demonstrated that large-scale conventional conflict remained possible on European territory, that military readiness and stockpiles mattered, and that the political will to sustain defence investment would be tested.

Crosetto inherited both the necessity and the political difficulty of responding to this new environment. Italy's defence spending, while increasing, remained below the NATO benchmark of 2% of GDP. The public debate about military investment — always sensitive in Italy — became more urgent and more contested simultaneously.

NATO Commitment and the 2% Target

Italy's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is foundational to its defence policy. Italy has been a member of NATO since the Alliance's founding in 1949, and its territory hosts several significant NATO facilities including NATO Joint Force Command Naples (the Alliance's southern command), the Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily, Aviano Air Base in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Camp Darby near Livorno. Italy is also one of five NATO members that host US tactical nuclear weapons under the Alliance's nuclear-sharing arrangements.

At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO members pledged to move toward spending 2% of gross domestic product on defence. Italy, like many European allies, had not met this benchmark in the years following the pledge. By 2022, Italian defence expenditure was estimated at approximately 1.5% of GDP — below the target but higher than in previous years.

Crosetto has been explicit about Italy's commitment to the 2% trajectory, framing increased spending not as an optional add-on but as a fundamental obligation of alliance membership. His argument has consistently emphasised that credibility within NATO depends partly on demonstrable investment: allies that under-invest lose standing and influence in collective decisions.

The political management of this commitment is not straightforward. Left-wing parties in Italy, particularly the Partito Democratico and the Movimento 5 Stelle, have generally opposed rapid increases in defence spending, citing competing social priorities. Crosetto has navigated this opposition through parliamentary debate, public communication and — crucially — by linking defence investment to Italian industrial and employment interests.

Military Modernisation

One of Crosetto's principal stated priorities has been the modernisation of Italy's armed forces. Italy's military equipment, across all three services, includes a mixture of relatively modern platforms and ageing systems that require replacement or upgrade. The pace of modernisation is constrained by budget availability, industrial capacity and procurement timelines — the last of which often extend over many years in large defence programmes.

Air Capability

Italy's Air Force (Aeronautica Militare) operates the Eurofighter Typhoon as its primary combat aircraft, in both single- and two-seat variants. Italy is also a participant in the Lockheed Martin F-35 programme — both the F-35A conventional take-off variant for the Air Force and the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing variant for the Navy's carrier aviation capability. Deliveries of F-35 aircraft have been ongoing, progressively increasing Italian air power capability. In addition, Italy is a partner in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), the joint Italy-United Kingdom-Japan initiative to develop a next-generation stealth combat aircraft system to enter service in the 2030s. GCAP represents Italy's most significant long-term defence investment commitment and a major industrial opportunity for Leonardo and its partners.

Naval Capability

The Marina Militare operates one of the most capable naval forces in the Mediterranean. Its principal assets include the aircraft carrier ITS Cavour, which has been certified for F-35B operations; the ITS Trieste, an amphibious assault ship commissioned in 2022; FREMM-class frigates built by Fincantieri in collaboration with France; diesel-electric submarines; and a range of patrol vessels and auxiliary craft. The Navy plays a particularly important role in Italy's Mediterranean security strategy and contributes significantly to NATO's standing naval commitments.

Land Forces

The Esercito Italiano is undergoing a structured modernisation programme covering armoured vehicles, artillery, air-defence systems, counter-drone capabilities, and digital command and communication systems. Italy has participated in various NATO capability development initiatives and has contributed armoured and specialised units to NATO's enhanced Forward Presence on the eastern flank.

Ukraine Policy

Italy's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been one of the most politically sensitive defence policy decisions of the Meloni government. Italy has provided military assistance to Ukraine — including air defence systems, artillery, and other equipment — within the framework established by parliamentary authorisation. The relevant legislation, adopted with broad parliamentary support, sets conditions for such assistance and requires periodic reporting to Parliament.

Crosetto has been a consistent and vocal supporter of maintaining military assistance to Ukraine, framing this as both a moral obligation and a strategic necessity. His position has placed him somewhat to the more activist end of the coalition government's spectrum on this issue, with other coalition parties — particularly Lega under Matteo Salvini — expressing more ambivalent positions at various points. The parliamentary management of Ukraine assistance has required ongoing political navigation.

Italy's position on Ukraine is also inseparable from its broader European commitments. Italy has aligned with EU sanctions policy, contributed to economic assistance programmes, and engaged in the multilateral diplomatic processes surrounding the conflict.

Mediterranean Strategy

Italy's security interests in the Mediterranean are extensive and longstanding. North Africa represents Italy's immediate strategic neighbourhood, and instability in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria or elsewhere affects Italian security directly — through migration flows, energy supply disruption, terrorist threats and the potential for hostile actors to exploit ungoverned spaces.

Crosetto has consistently emphasised the Mediterranean as a strategic priority and has been active in developing bilateral defence cooperation with Mediterranean partners, including in North Africa. Italy participates in the EU's EUNAVFOR MED IRINI mission, which monitors the arms embargo on Libya, and contributes to maritime security operations. The Italian Navy's Southern Command at Taranto has particular significance for Mediterranean operations.

Italy also participates in the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue, a framework for cooperation with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Crosetto has engaged with defence counterparts across the region.

European Defence Cooperation

Italy's position on European defence integration combines support for greater European capability with insistence that EU initiatives must complement rather than undermine NATO. Italy participates in the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, contributes to the European Defence Fund (EDF), and has engaged with the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as it has developed.

Crosetto has shown genuine interest in European defence industrial cooperation, recognising that Italian companies — particularly Leonardo and Fincantieri — stand to benefit significantly from a more integrated European defence market and from collaborative R&D programmes. The GCAP programme, while not an EU programme, demonstrates Italy's willingness to engage in multinational capability development beyond traditional bilateral frameworks.

The Domestic Policy Debate

Defence policy in Italy cannot be understood without acknowledging the domestic political context. Italy's constitution, in Article 11, explicitly renounces war as a means of settling international disputes — a provision that has been interpreted broadly in public discourse to encompass scepticism of military expenditure more generally. Public opinion polling in Italy has historically shown less enthusiasm for defence spending than in some other NATO allies.

The parliamentary opposition to defence spending increases has been persistent. Critics from the left argue that military investment competes with social expenditure on healthcare, education and housing; that the 2% target is an arbitrary number set to benefit defence industry rather than improve security; and that diplomacy rather than armament should be the primary tool of Italian foreign policy.

Crosetto has engaged these arguments directly, publicly and sometimes sharply. He has contested the framing that defence investment is in competition with social expenditure, arguing instead that security is a precondition of prosperity. He has also argued that Italy's defence industry — which employs tens of thousands of workers and contributes to the technology base of the economy — is itself a social and economic asset. These arguments have had some success in broadening the political coalition for gradual spending increases, though significant opposition remains.

Strategic Planning Framework

Italy's formal strategic planning is informed by the 2015 White Paper on International Security and Defence (Libro Bianco per la Sicurezza Internazionale e la Difesa), which set out Italy's strategic interests, threat perceptions and capability priorities. This document, while now somewhat dated given the changes in the European security environment since 2022, remains a reference point for institutional planning. A new strategic review or white paper may be warranted given the changed threat environment.

The Ministry of Defence also operates within the broader Italian national security framework, which includes intelligence services, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers' strategic coordination role and Italy's engagement in multilateral security forums. Crosetto has been an active participant in the multilateral NATO and EU defence structures that shape collective security planning.

Sources and Further Reading