International Relations

Italy's International Role

Italy's international standing rests on several pillars that give it disproportionate influence relative to its size. As a founding member of both NATO (1949) and what is now the European Union (Treaty of Rome, 1957), Italy helped to design the post-war Western order and retains institutional weight within it that newer members cannot match.

Geographically, Italy's central Mediterranean position is of enormous strategic value. The Italian peninsula, Sicily, and Sardinia control or overlook major shipping lanes between the western and eastern Mediterranean, and between Europe and North Africa. This geography makes Italy a pivotal player in any discussion of migration management, energy transit, and naval operations in the theatre that the alliance increasingly regards as a southern flank requiring as much attention as the eastern one.

Italy is a G7 member, making it part of the informal steering group of the world's principal liberal democracies. It hosts significant NATO infrastructure, including the Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFCNP) and, crucially, two bases that participate in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement — Aviano Air Base and Ghedi Air Base — making Italy one of only five alliance members with this role.

The Italian armed forces maintain deployments across multiple theatres simultaneously — the Balkans, Lebanon, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Afghanistan's legacy missions — making Italy one of the more operationally active military contributors within the alliance, even if its absolute force numbers and defence spending have historically fallen short of NATO's 2% GDP guideline.

Crosetto's Approach to International Relations

Guido Crosetto's approach to international relations as minister can be characterised by several consistent themes that have defined Italy's defence diplomacy since October 2022.

Strong Atlanticism

Crosetto has been unambiguously pro-NATO from the outset of his ministerial tenure. This was significant given initial uncertainty — among some allies and commentators — about whether a government led by Fratelli d'Italia would maintain Italy's Atlanticist orientation. Crosetto helped dispel those concerns rapidly, both in public statements and in bilateral meetings with NATO counterparts. His support for NATO structures, the alliance's collective defence commitments under Article 5, and the goal of 2% of GDP on defence has been consistent and public.

EU Defence Within the NATO Framework

On European defence integration, Crosetto has backed greater EU capability development while maintaining that European efforts must complement and reinforce — rather than duplicate or compete with — NATO. This is the standard Italian (and broadly, Atlanticist) position on EU defence, one that places Italy closer to the UK and US preference and somewhat at variance with the more ambitious French vision of European strategic autonomy. His engagement with PESCO projects and EU defence industrial initiatives has been active but anchored to this Atlantic compatibility test.

Mediterranean Priority

Crosetto has been consistent in arguing that the Alliance must pay more sustained attention to the southern neighbourhood. While eastern flank concerns — understandably — dominated the post-2022 agenda, he has advanced the case that instability in Libya, irregular migration in the central Mediterranean, and the growing influence of non-Western powers in North Africa constitute a strategic challenge that requires equally serious treatment.

Ukraine Support Within Constitutional Constraints

Italy has continued to provide military, financial, and humanitarian support to Ukraine under Crosetto's watch. He has managed this policy within the constraints of Italy's constitutional framework — which requires parliamentary authorisation for major military assistance packages — and in a coalition context that required careful management of partners with different instincts on the matter. His stated position has consistently been that Ukraine's right to sovereignty and territorial integrity must be upheld.

Pro-US Positioning

Crosetto has been notably warm toward the United States across administrations. The Italy-US bilateral defence relationship — anchored in shared nuclear arrangements, base access, and extensive military cooperation — is, in his view, the backbone of Italy's security. He has worked to ensure that this relationship remains strong even when transatlantic frictions arise over burden-sharing or trade.

Key Bilateral Relationships

United States

The US-Italy defence relationship is the most fundamental of Italy's bilateral security partnerships. American bases in Italy — including Sigonella in Sicily, Aviano in Friuli, and Camp Darby near Livorno — reflect decades of deep interoperability. The nuclear sharing arrangement at Aviano and Ghedi embeds Italy in the alliance's highest-sensitivity security architecture. Crosetto has consistently regarded the US relationship as the cornerstone of Italian security and has worked to maintain it through changes in both governments.

France

The France-Italy relationship is simultaneously a partnership and a competition. On the industrial side, both countries' defence companies compete for major programmes; MBDA is a shared enterprise that bridges this tension. On strategy, both countries are Mediterranean powers with interests in North Africa, yet their approaches have often diverged — notably over Libya, where Italian and French-backed factions have historically been in conflict. The bilateral Quirinal Treaty (signed 2021) aims to deepen the relationship, though practical tensions persist, including over migration policy and Mediterranean leadership.

Germany

Germany is Italy's principal partner within the EU framework, but the strategic cultures differ significantly. Germany's Zeitenwende (announced in 2022) began to address decades of under-investment in defence, and Italy has watched with interest as Berlin moved toward greater military capability and engagement. The EU dimension of defence industrial cooperation — including PESCO projects — makes Italy-Germany alignment important. There are also shared interests in EU economic governance and in managing the relationship with China and Russia that create regular diplomatic interaction.

United Kingdom

Post-Brexit, the UK and Italy have found a new basis for bilateral defence cooperation — most prominently in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). Italy signed the GCAP treaty in December 2022, committing to develop a next-generation fighter aircraft alongside the UK and Japan. This trilateral programme represents one of Italy's most significant long-term defence industrial commitments and an important element of the Italy-UK bilateral relationship. The UK and Italy share NATO membership and similar Atlanticist orientations, providing a basis for cooperation that transcends EU membership.

Japan

Japan's inclusion in GCAP alongside Italy and the UK reflects both the programme's ambition and a broadening of Italy's strategic horizon toward the Indo-Pacific. The triangular partnership is operationally complex — Japan's constitutional and export control constraints differ significantly from those of the European partners — but Italy has actively engaged with Japan to make the arrangement work. More broadly, Italy under Crosetto has been attentive to Indo-Pacific dynamics, recognising that the security of the rules-based order there has implications for Europe too.

Turkey

Turkey is among the most complex relationships in Italy's NATO context. Ankara's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system created lasting tensions within the alliance. Turkey's role as a gatekeeper on NATO enlargement — demonstrated during the Swedish and Finnish accession processes — and its assertive policies in the eastern Mediterranean, where Turkish and Italian interests in Libya have often diverged, make the relationship one that requires ongoing management. Nevertheless, Turkey remains an important NATO ally, and Italy has worked to maintain functional relations while navigating these frictions.

Mediterranean Partners

Italy's relationships with Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt are shaped by overlapping interests: energy supply (particularly since the 2022 energy crisis underscored Italy's dependence on alternatives to Russian gas), migration management, counter-terrorism, and regional stability. The Mattei Plan for Africa, the broader Italian government initiative under Prime Minister Meloni, is the overarching framework within which Italy seeks to establish a partnership approach to the continent that goes beyond emergency management. Crosetto's ministry contributes the security and defence cooperation dimension of this broader engagement.

Major Themes in Crosetto's International Agenda

NATO Solidarity and the 2% Commitment

Italy's historically low defence spending — around 1.4–1.5% of GDP for much of the post-Cold War period — has been a source of friction with the United States and other allies who meet or exceed the 2% guideline. Crosetto has been a vocal advocate for Italy moving credibly toward 2% and has managed multi-year spending plans intended to demonstrate this trajectory. The challenge is real: in a fiscal environment constrained by Italy's debt levels, finding the additional resources for defence requires political will and difficult trade-offs.

EU Defence Integration

Italy is an active participant in the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PESCO), which aims to develop joint capabilities and harmonise defence investment among willing member states. Crosetto has engaged with EU defence forums including the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the new European Defence Industrial Strategy. His consistent position is that EU initiatives must produce real capability without duplicating NATO command structures — a pragmatic line that reflects Italy's deep integration in both frameworks.

Ukraine and European Security

Italy's Ukraine policy under Crosetto has included substantial military assistance — artillery systems, air defence components, training — delivered in coordination with European allies. He has navigated the domestic politics of this support in a country where polls have often shown significant public ambivalence about military aid to Ukraine. His management of the issue has required both firmness on principle and sensitivity to coalition dynamics.

Mediterranean Stability and Migration

The central Mediterranean migration route — from North Africa through Italian and Maltese waters — is one of the most politically sensitive issues in Italian domestic politics and a major driver of Rome's foreign policy choices. The military dimension (naval interception, coast guard cooperation, training Libyan and other authorities) intersects directly with the defence minister's portfolio. EUNAVFOR MED Irini, the EU mission to enforce the Libya arms embargo, is headquartered in Rome, and Italy has been a consistent contributor.

Africa and the Mattei Plan

Prime Minister Meloni's Mattei Plan for Africa — named after the ENI founder Enrico Mattei, who championed a non-exploitative Italian relationship with Africa — aims to develop an Italian approach to the continent built on partnership rather than aid dependency. The defence and security dimension of this ambition, including training missions, security sector reform, and counter-terrorism cooperation in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, falls within Crosetto's purview. Italy's withdrawal from the Mali mission and ongoing engagement in Niger and other Sahelian states have tested the limits of this ambition amid regional instability.

Defence Industrial Cooperation

Italy's defence industrial base — including Leonardo, Fincantieri, and the Italian components of MBDA — is a significant economic actor as well as a strategic asset. Crosetto, with his AIAD background, has been an unusually active ministerial voice on industrial cooperation, export policy, and European defence consolidation. Italy's participation in GCAP is the flagship example, but there are many smaller bilateral industrial arrangements that require active management.

Multilateral Engagement

Crosetto has been a regular and active participant in the principal multilateral forums that shape defence and security policy.

At NATO, the Defence Ministers' meetings (held twice yearly in Brussels, with additional summits at heads-of-state level) are the primary venue. Italy's participation in NATO's Multinational Corps structures, its contribution to NATO battlegroups, and its role in alliance command arrangements make these meetings directly consequential for Italian policy. Crosetto has used them to advance Italy's positions on southern flank attention, burden sharing, and Ukraine.

At the EU, the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence configuration) meets regularly and brings together EU defence ministers to coordinate on the full range of EU defence initiatives — from PESCO to EU training missions to the European Peace Facility (which co-funds military assistance to Ukraine). Italy's engagement in EUNAVFOR Irini and its PESCO commitments are coordinated through this channel.

The G7 Defence Ministers' forum, which has become more prominent since 2022, brings together Italy with its closest allies (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Japan) in a smaller, higher-trust format for strategic discussion. Italy has used this forum to reinforce its Atlanticist positioning and its Ukraine commitment.

Italy's peacekeeping record — UNIFIL in Lebanon, KFOR in Kosovo (where Italy has been among the largest contributors since 1999), and various African missions — also involves significant multilateral management, including relationships with UN bodies, host nations, and partner contributing countries.

Challenges in International Relations

Domestic Political Constraints

Italy's constitution requires parliamentary authorisation for major military engagements and aid packages, which means domestic politics directly constrains the minister's freedom of action in ways that are less common in some allied countries. Managing the parliamentary timeline alongside operational requirements and allied expectations is a perennial challenge. Crosetto has generally been successful in securing the necessary authorisations, but the process requires sustained political management.

Coalition Management

The governing coalition brings together FdI, Lega, and Forza Italia — parties with notably different instincts on Russia, Ukraine, and the transatlantic relationship. Crosetto has operated in an environment where the foreign policy and defence positions of coalition partners have sometimes required careful accommodation. He has generally maintained a clear line on core alliance commitments while avoiding unnecessary internal confrontations.

Budget Pressures

Reaching 2% of GDP on defence requires sustained increases in a fiscal environment constrained by Italy's public debt, EU fiscal rules (now reactivated after the COVID-era suspension), and competing domestic spending priorities. Crosetto has been the most vocal advocate within the government for defence investment, but translating this advocacy into consistent budget increases involves ongoing battles with the treasury and with coalition partners who prioritise other expenditures.

Multiple Theatre Commitments

Italy's simultaneous presence in Lebanon, Kosovo, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Iraq, and multiple NATO structures — together with the demands of bilateral exercises and interoperability programmes — places considerable strain on the armed forces. Managing these commitments while also investing in modernisation and new capabilities is the classic defence planning dilemma, and one that Crosetto has had to navigate with a force that remains below optimal manning and equipment levels in some areas.

Migration Diplomacy

The interplay between migration management and diplomatic relations with North African and Sahelian states creates a permanent tension in Italian foreign policy. Agreements that reduce migration flows sometimes require compromises on human rights conditionality or on the governance quality of partner states. The defence ministry's role in training Libyan and other coast guards, and in bilateral security cooperation, puts Crosetto at the intersection of these pressures.